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by Reginald Herbold Green
Time past and time future
Are both, perhaps, contained in time present...
Redeem the time.
- T.S. Eliot
To plan is to choose 
Choose to go forward.
Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere
Do unto others
As you would have them do unto you
Inasmuch as ye have done it 
Unto the least o f these my brethren 
Ye have done it unto me.
- The Christ
Rabbit, rabbit, where are you going?
I'm going out to kill the elephant.
Rabbit, Rabbit can you really do that?
Well, I'll try. And try again.
- Great Lakes Proverb
(DRAFT)
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I.
PERSISTENCE AND PERMUTATION: A M oving Setting
Poverty has always been central to African societies, polities and economies and to most African 
households. This is hardly surprising - until the 19th Century it was the norm throughout the 
world w ith exceptions usually ended by natural or war disasters.
Pre colonial African poverty was pervasive, life shortening and complex. So too today but not in 
precisely the same ways and within rather different structures.
Personal consumption poverty was in many, but not all, areas endemic because o f  low 
productivity and very high transport cost plus physical barriers to movement. As a result o f the 
latter drought crises tended to be more disastrous for poor people and often led to state collapse, 
e.g. the Sahelian empires. Famine was a significant factor in low population growth - as was the 
slave trade in some areas and war in rather more.
Low access to basic services was endemic and structural but - until late in the colonial period - 
not prominent in commentary. This is hardly surprising because universal state led access to 
basic health services, primary education, pure water and - less uniformly - basic transport 
infrastructure were, at the least, uncommon globally as well as in Africa. Each was provided 
selectively and unequally to part o f the population by mixed state, religious and secular civil 
society bodies but universal access is a 19th century concept not broadly realised before the 20lh.
The one basic service states did seek to provide was security - for households to go about their 
daily lives unmolested and for trade to flow. As elsewhere quality o f delivery in Africa varied 
greatly and was in a contradictory relationship with state expansion aspirations.
Inequality was high but often in clientelist and affinity structures which lessened antagonism to it 
unless m iserliness, exploitation and corrupt use o f office were combined with it. The social 
contracts did usually require the rich and powerful to provide security, some transfer payments 
and safety nets for poor households clustered around them and access ladders for some kinsmen.
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The modern view o f poverty in Africa and o f Africans largely emerged in the 1930's and 1940's 
and became a driving force in policy in the late colonial period. It had a macro/sectoral aspect o f 
overall output, export and state revenue growth and a state led/household oriented basic service 
plus market support and/or intervention (infrastructure and monopolies) thrust. This pattern 
persisted at least until the 1970's in most independent states with divergences largely on the 
emphasis on moving toward universal access to basic services, emergency food security and the 
respective weights put on public and private enterprise. Differences in accountability and 
participation were real (and the subjects o f dialogue and controversy) but not usually directly 
linked to poverty reduction/livelihood enhancement policy, albeit higher levels o f accountability 
and o f poor or almost poor people's participation did tend to parallel/interact with stress on 
poverty reduction.
The so called growth and modernisation consensus o f the 1950's to 1970's was a two pronged 
thrust to raise per capita output with enhanced access to basic services, infrastructure and 
institutions a necessary input. Even more radical governments - e.g. Tanzania - expected the 
services/infrastructure/institutions to lead both to output growth and - with equal access to 
markets for poor people, whether via household, cooperative, private sector or state enterprises - 
also to lead to generalised household personal income, as well as service access, growth.
By the late 1960's - and especially the 1970's - the limitations o f this model were becoming clear. 
In the first place high sustained growth proved hard to achieve. Further the fruits o f growth (and 
the access to services and to markets) did not approach universality so that the poorest half o f  the 
population were little affected - a real concern to some (not all) analysts and political leaders as 
well as - one must assume - poor people.
The attempts - in practice e.g. Tanzania and in quite different ways Botswana and in 
conceptualisation and analysis e.g. the Redistribution With Growth and Basic Needs 'schools' - to 
devise an alternative, more poor person friendly growth and development model flourished in the 
early 1970's but withered in the 1980's (not only in Africa) in the face o f  a prolonged recession 
and the Northwestern thrust for market liberalisation and inflation squeezing out at hom e and 
away as overriding priorities. It re-emerged partly as critiques to the more neo liberal versions o f 
structural adjustment and, more relevantly perhaps, as contextual responses to the abiding and
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deepening realities o f  African poverty and - especially - collapse o f  access to basic public 
services (especially law - order - security for the quarter o f Sub Saharan Africans in war wracked 
economies and polities).
At present the volume o f work - usually descriptive or descripto analytical - on poverty o f 
Africans is much higher than before and is rising. It is o f uneven quality, still offers little in the 
way o f reliable time series, has severe intra and inter country comparability problems and 
overem phasises personal (household) consumption relative to other elements. But it now does 
provide a base for reflective, processual, causal analysis both comparative and contextual.
It can be argued that the data and - especially - the analysis remain imprecise, often inaccurate 
and open to alternative explanations. While true these objections apply to most applied political 
economic work - not simply in respect to poverty or in Africa. The appropriate reflection is 
perhaps that o f the first systematic political economist whose work is fairly fully available - 
Aristotle. He warned that with such topics, data, methods and purposes broad correctness as to 
realities, relationships and results of actions was both the most that could be achieved and very 
much better than not exploring, reflecting and acting.
This paper will seek first to explore concepts and methods o f poverty definition, mapping and 
articulation. It then moves toward processual and causal analysis. A brief panorama o f African 
poverty as the millennium ends is followed by a snapshot o f Tanzania. In conclusion possible 
strategic policies and programmes toward sustainable poverty reduction are sketched.
II.
POVERTY: AN EXPLORATION OF CONCEPTS AND ASPECTS
Poverty can be conceptualised as low levels of wellfare and presence o f deprivation. That 
approach is broad enough to cover household personal consumption, access to basic services, 
socio political participation (or its absence) safety nets (including trampolines to allow earned 
income recovery after calamities), absence o f war and social capital. However, while useful in its 
holistic approach, it is hard to apply rigorously, especially as several components are hard to
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represent quantitatively or -  for comparative purposes at least -  even ordinally. Sen’s lack o f 
entitlements is basically an alternative formulation o f this definition.
Poverty is thus a continuum and has relative as well as absolute aspects. Poverty lines normally 
relate either to absolute poverty or to minimum socially acceptable levels of wellfare. In fact, 
official areas cover only household personal consumption. There is no inherent reason this must 
be so. A multiple index representation o f poverty is perfectly possible and would -  assuming 
avoidance o f black-boxing the components into one symbolic number -  allow targeting o f 
specific aspects o f deprivation affecting different groups. Absolute household personal 
consumption poverty (defined in terms o f nutritional diet plus other necessary items) is 
moderately non-controversial in main outline albeit practical problems -  not least urban, peri 
urban, town and rural comparability within countries and even more the World Bank’s 
desperate attempt to create a $1 per head per day cutoff line using (highly suspect and non­
comparable) Purchasing Power Parity conversions. Relative poverty (and socially just 
acceptable income lines) pose more problems because both personal and cultural group choices 
are wider and differ more at higher levels. However, even at absolute poverty line assessment, it 
is problematic to ignore culturally determined necessary (or at least basic) expenditure -  e.g. 
burial in home area -  which are no less priority uses o f funds because nutritionists or economic 
analysts say otherwise.
The conflict between survey and participatory approaches is intermingled with that on whether 
the predominance given to household personal expenditure should be reduced by broadening the 
range o f aspects o f poverty surveyed and used integrally in policy formulation and 
implementation (a rerun o f the older debate on dethroning GDP per capita as the sole index o f 
development). There is no inherent reason surveys o f access to basic services and safety nets 
cannot be as precise and confirmed as o f consumption (indeed they sometimes are) and be given 
much more weight in the future in formulating policies and programmes. Similarly, while at one 
extreme surveys can be respectful (uncritical) acceptance o f answers to externally identified 
conceptualisations o f poverty and participatory critical challenge to and reshaping o f answers in 
a context moving toward mutually agreed concepts/key questions shared by explorers and poor 
participants, in practice surveys or participatory appraisals are that monistic. That personal 
consumption matters a great deal to poor people is not a researcher-imposed myth. N or is the
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need to have some initial framework and some effort at collecting at least ordinally empirical 
data, perhaps achieving some comparability (at least at one site over time) or avoiding totally 
reshaping answers by mediator/interrogator ‘leadership’ absent from the main body o f 
participatory work.
In practice, the key problems are over-emphasis on household personal consumption to the 
exclusion o f  other aspects o f poverty in surveys, or at least use o f survey results, and inadequate 
attention to quantification and comparability in participatory. When tried, multiple but 
coordinated approaches appear to promise both maps o f and roads to changing reality superior to 
these attainable through single method approaches.
The basic features o f poverty needed for mapping it include:
1. Household personal consumption.
2. Access to and use of basic services (security, health services, education, water).
3. Access to markets.
4. Endemic poverty safety nets (for cases o f working hands to mouths to feed ratios making 
earned income inherently inadequate).
5. Transient calamity or catastrophe trampolines to keep households together and able to 
jum p back into production when drought or war ends.
6. Key social indicator performance (notably life expectancy at birth, infant and under 5 
m ortality, child and adult malnutrition, literacy) as a test o f and complement to the first two 
aspects (e.g. if  universal access to basic health services is parallel to 250 infant and under 5 
m ortality and 40 years life expectancy at birth, either there are special climatic or 
occupational problems, a very low quality o f health services or totally unreliable data).
7. C om m unity, social group and political participation (little or none o f which is inherently 
non- quantifiable at ordinally (e.g. high, moderately high, moderate, moderately low, low, 
nil).
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8. Specific contextual (local, zonal, national) aspects (e.g. absence o f  vermin control against 
baboons or crocodiles; occupational and environmental risks and human damage from small- 
scale mining)
9. Earned and transfer incomes (the basic entitlement to household personal consum ption and 
access to private or fee charging basic services)
10. Workload and time allocations both to identify deprivation from overwork and potential 
entry points for reducing it (e.g. nearby water access for women and girls especially but not 
only in rural and peri urban contexts).
Gender (or youth/children) aspects do not fit neatly into this topographical feature list but are 
important to mapping and acting. Unfortunately, they are rarely prominent among spontaneously 
raised items in community (as contrasted with women only) participatory processes and are 
clearly complex:
(a) Women/girls have roughly equal access to food/health services as men/boys but lower 
access to education.
(b) Female headed households, on average are smaller than male (not surprisingly as ex 
defmitio, at least in SSA they lack adult male members). They do not -  at least in urban 
areas -  have clearly lower average incomes but may be distributed bipolarly, with a 
minority well above average income teachers -  nurses -  substantial ‘inform al’ traders and 
a majority well below average income uneducated, unwaged pole so that a sub category 
o f female headed households remain a priority poverty reduction group.
(c) Women (and girls) work longer than men (and boys) presumptively because almost all 
household infrastructure/reproduction work is female (other than construction). For poor 
women, the result is likely to be work overload and for their daughters poor school access 
or results and increased probability o f remaining poor
(d) W omen’s economic -  in the sense o f income generating -  activity is rising both as a 
result o f economic stress and w om en’s initiatives (e.g. the female income earning 
collaboration aspect o f the UNICEF catalysed child nutrition programmes in rural
6
Tanzania has been far more central than expected and has probably been crucial to 
w om en’s support which has been central to the programmes’ very measurable success at 
reducing moderate child malnutrition and even more radically reducing severe in non- 
climatic disaster years/areas).
(e) Household time -  income — obligation budgets are rarely unified. The 
relations/interactions between male and female are usually unequal but by no means 
unilateral or not involving mutual cross obligations. Their nature(s) and change over 
time (perhaps in favour o f women as their income earning activity rises?) are little 
explored.
(f) Both study and policy are tending to become ghettoised -  largely carried out by women 
and marginal or symbolic as to resources devoted. Mainline surveys and poverty 
reduction strategies largely treat gender aspects as trivial by overlooking or marginalising 
them. On the other hand, women’s socio political participation and w om en’s groups are 
increasingly influential in some countries (although perhaps especially so among non­
poor women who may or may not be closely linked to their poorer sisters).
Child labour -  household maintenance, household income generation, domestic hired and ‘self 
employed inform al’ -  has risen. How much and to what levels is variable and disputed as are the 
consequences (largely, but perhaps not wholly, negative). The focus on isolated (from home 
household) street children is probably misplaced -  other affected groups are much larger and 
some appear to be severely afflicted.
Com parability and consolidation are serious problems. This is not limited to urban/rural 
domestically albeit uniform valuation o f consumption (perhaps at urban retail prices?) and 
treatm ent o f  extra costs o f urban life are as yet rarely tackled convincingly. At present, this may 
not m uch alter policy and programmes but it does overstate urban/rural gaps. Comparability or 
elements other than household personal consumption are inherently harder. Basic service access 
is more quality variable than maize meal e.g. outage rates for rural water appear to vary from 
10% to over 50%, the years o f teaching needed (including repeats and dropouts) for a complete 
5-year prim ary course varies from under 10 to over 25 (in the latter case with a majority o f
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completers uncertain in basic arithmetic, barely able to read and far from fluent in the medium of 
instruction as are up to two-thirds o f their teachers).
The first priority is national comparability especially aspects which would allow greater 
understanding o f and insights into sustainable reduction o f poverty. International -  however 
beloved o f international bodies and aid agencies -  is much less crucial. At present -  given the 
massive problems o f Comparative Purchasing Power adjustments -  it is arguably a bridge too 
far. In general, where seriously dane, notional poverty lines are more convincing than attempts at 
applying the World Bank’s globally comparable one.
Consolidation also poses problems. That it can be done relatively easily for household personal 
consumption has enhanced the undue emphasis given to that aspect o f  poverty. Arguably a set of 
key indices -  including all the ten aspects listed above -  would be a more useful guide to policy 
(state or civil society) than one alone, let alone a composite which black boxes its elements and -  
whatever its headline catching symbolic value -  hampers contextual articulation.
Seasonal and life cycle poverty have been studied in some countries but outside the main 
poverty mapping and -  especially -  policy frame. Whether they deepen poverty and/or have 
cumulative impact making sustainable reduction harder is unclear, e.g. if  hunger (and thus 
deprivation o f strength) is greatest in rural Africa at peak labour requirement (notably harvest) 
seasons, then it does reduce productivity (covered by annual data) and makes its raising harder 
(not covered). Because poor households are usually smaller than average (because o f fewer 
children) it is not clear that poverty affects a higher percentage o f children than o f adults. That 
however is not an argument against national, OAV and UNICEF child poverty reduction 
strategies. Nutritional and health deprivation for children (the former at least more prevalent 
than for adults and usually reducible within manageable cost parameters) have greater lasting 
impact for children than adults while lack o f  access to education reduces future 
productivity/access to livelihoods and probably to socio-political participation. That 
unambiguously reduces the attainable pace o f sustainable poverty reduction.
Old age (and handicapped person) poverty is more ambiguous. Its direct productivity 
consequences nationally are low and earned income restoration is rarely a plausible target. The 
basic justification is that how a society treats its weakest members is a test o f its basic nature.
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The secondary is that the greater the risk o f being poor because o f injury in old age and from 
crippling, the greater the imperative to have many children fast to increase the chances o f 
household safety nets.
M oral/spiritual poverty is usually dismissed, or boxed off as an issue for religious groups. This 
may be true if  it is individual and passive. When it is social and aggressive (or leading to 
resigned passivity) that perception is faulty. The erosion o f agreed notions and o f mutual respect 
w ithin society lends directly to higher crime rates and to civil unrest -  both o f which impose 
national costs and production losses probably falling disproportionately on poor people. As 
violent crime, corruption and civil unrest are by no means 1:1 correlated with poverty (e.g. as o f 
1990 Tanzania was arguably poorer -  or at least not much less poor -  than Rwanda; on broad 
personal consumption and access levels South Africa is well above the SSA average) there does 
appear to be a separate moral (or social norm or social capital) aspect deserving more 
investigation and -  if  possible -  rehabilitation or renewal support, not just containment and 
suppression.
Two aspects o f  poverty stand out as under-emphasised and explored when standing back from 
the African literature while reviewing it. The first is income; the second is effort to acquire it.
Entitlements -  a much broader term applying to basic services, safety nets and socio political 
access as well as income for personal consumption -  are regularly cited albeit attempts at hard 
analysis are much less common. But household income -  the primary entitlement to personal 
consumption -  is less analysed in poverty terms than is consumption.
For poverty mapping this is readily explicable -  implausible consumption/income ratios appear 
at the top and, more crucial, the bottom of the income spectrum so that consumption figures are 
usually much closer approximations to reality. For poverty reduction the case may be weaker. 
For exam ple, household survey income data show that wages, including in practice some 
‘inform al’ (i.e. unresearched) enterprise wages, are the largest component o f urban income (over 
60% in M aputo with only the bottom 20% o f households markedly lower). Further, they suggest 
(a suggestion confirmed by direct questioning) that households with formal sector wage earners 
are the ‘inform al’ sector’s dominant market. This casts doubt on the enthusiasts for the
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‘inform al’ sector as a substitute or replacement for the formal and, more positively, points 
toward exploration o f ways to bolster both through their complementarities.
Poverty mapping -  partly because o f data collected and partly because o f lack o f time series - 
rarely explores changes in total household time input into income generation and -  still more -  
labour contribution to basic services provision. What sketchy commentary exists, is largely 
commentary on wom en’s increasing work (over) load or criticism o f structural adjustment for 
forcing poor people to work longer to stay at the same level o f personal consumption.
It is clear that for most households total hours devoted to income generation have grown and 
that -  at least in urban areas -  more household members are significant income providers
than twenty-five years ago. In urban areas, the added earners are primarily women (which is not 
self-evidently negative -  they had little participation then and their status suffered because o f it) 
and children (unambiguously undesireable). The rural shift may be less gendered and may be 
heaviest for girls (who work more than boys and apparently to free women’s time from 
household infrastructural to earning activities). While it is not clear more work by household 
members to earn is per se a bad thing (it has characterised Europe and, especially, the USA over 
the same period) more exploration is needed. It would also make clearer why real wage declines 
(somewhat, or more, misleading because o f the rise o f non-core wage payments) are a very poor 
guide to urban household real incomes. That is just as well -  otherwise most urban residents in 
many African countries would have died (or fled to rural home areas) long ago.
I ll
CAUSAL ELEMENTS AND DYNAMICS OF POVERTY
Mapping poverty is basically a descriptive or descripto-analytical process. It can provide a 
foundation for causal element identification but is not in itself an analysis o f  causal relationships 
and dynamics.
Low production per capita and uneven income distribution are at one level two o f the four 
dominant causes o f Africa poverty and even the other two -  natural calamities (especially
10
drought) and w ar are subsumed in large part into output measures. However, these answers 
necessarily pose the questions ‘W hy?’ and ‘What can be done?' prior to strategy formulation, let 
alone policy and programme articulation. Fairly clearly massive redistribution by taxation and 
transfer paym ents or market price rigging is not a fruitful way forward in SSA. The political 
resistance, the probable damage to output and the limited gains available in low income countries 
all point in that direction. However, removing policies and regulations discriminating against the 
poor and seeking to channel growth in poor person friendly ways (redistribution out o f growth) 
including progress to universal access to security and other basic services and to 
tram polines/safety nets are more promising. They are also more complex -  the reductions in 
income inequality showing up rather generally in early 1990s surveys (but less so more recently) 
have reduced the rate o f  growth o f the poverty headcount but are rarely analytically explained. 
Freeing market forces is a very problematic answer -  the usual result o f  that process is the 
reverse. Reducing urban/rural inequality by erosion o f real urban household incomes paralleled 
by lesser falls or very modest rises in rural certainly does reduce national gini coefficients, but its 
meaning in terms o f poverty reduction is -  to say the least -  deeply ambiguous. It can hardly be 
a sustainable process.
A partially overlapping semi disaggregated checklist is possible:
1. Low and stagnant productivity by identifiable operational categories o f poor people -  e.g. 
uneducated urban female heads o f household, small farming families specialising in domestic 
staple foods as ‘cash’ as well as ‘subsistence’ crops; rural households more than 10 
kilom etres from an all year road -  is both a cause and an entry point to policy articulation -  
e.g. simple vocational/artisanal education, staple food crop research and extension on small 
farming household lines plus encouragement (via knowledge, credit, market access) o f  crop 
diversification, building more rural roads and maintaining them less badly. A more general 
set o f  causes are poor health, poor nutrition and little (basic or vocational) education. The 
weak, sick and ill fed -  whether in the formal, the informal or the self employed sectors -  are 
highly unlikely to be able to work long, hard and effectively.
2. Access to basic services (health care, education, water production extension services, 
calamity tram polines and security) -  or rather lack thereof -  are major causes o f  poverty.
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Law and order is never enough -  as argued cogently in criticising colonial states -  but 
without it there will not be much else as brutally demonstrated in the 1980's and 1990's. 
Recent surveys o f poor people’s concerns and more participatory input collection processes 
highlight both water and security which have to date not generally featured prominently on 
basic services lists. They also flag dissatisfaction with the quality o f education -  and/or a 
realisation that at primary and lower secondary level it is (whatever it may once have been) a 
passport to a job or other upmarket livelihood - by rating it surprisingly low on major gaps 
and priorities for more supply lists.
3. Inadequate access to capital notably land use rights, inputs (in kind or via credit to 
purchase), knowledge (overlapping extension and education), social capital (community 
enabling or supporting), market infrastructure (notably roads) is a major barrier (in varying 
ways) for artisans, small business persons and small farming families. In part this reflects 
general scarcity, in part ill designed institutions (public and private), in part discrimination 
(e.g. for the rich, against women). Without institutional reform and discrimination reduction, 
throwing money at this cause will not do much good -  especially as little o f it will ever reach 
or benefit poor households.
4. General or widely impacting calamities (natural disasters) beyond household and family or 
community safety net capacity to ride out or adjust to. The impact o f  drought need not be 
death or permanent loss o f livelihood. But in the absence o f  trampolines to preserve future 
livelihood capacity (including prepared land, seed, tools, core livestock herds) deaths and 
broader permanent income degradation into poverty will result. Similarly terms o f trade 
shifts which are major and/or unlikely to be reversed in the absence o f capacity (not least 
knowledge o f alternatives) can have a massive lasting impoverishment impact.
5. Calamities specific to households -  especially illness, disablement or death o f a key earner 
-  are a significant cause. In the case o f illness better health access and better family and 
community safety nets (social capital) are ways forward. In the other cases it is harder to 
identify truly viable, poverty alleviating or reversing instruments.
6. W a r is probably the largest single cause o f poverty in SSA. However, it is a very non 
uniform one. Where the war is civil and on home soil it is dominant with reversal depending
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heavily on government and national rehabilitation -  reconstruction -  rehabilitation strategy 
and praxis. W here the war is abroad the burden o f keeping it there (deterrence and or mutual 
defence deployment) can be substantial affecting poverty by forced reallocation o f public 
resources.
7. Population (more specifically population growth and gross birth rates) can be a significant 
aggravating factor. However, the direction o f causality is mixed. High child mortality, lack 
o f  old age and calamity security except from children, major epidemics (notably malaria and 
HIV/AIDS) cause high birth rates. High population growth feeds back by raising the costs o f 
moving to universal basic service access, reducing the proportion o f working age population 
(and forcing increased dependence on child labour) and increasing pressure in natural 
resource and capital supplies. Arguably therefore, population is not a promising direct entry 
point whereas reducing child mortality, improving health service access and targeting main 
killer diseases, increasing access to education and broadening safety nets are. This is not to 
argue against family planning education and facilities to meet demand, but rather to suggest 
they may be secondary and to require an enabling context o f progress on other poverty 
reduction fronts to be effective.
8. Inadequate public revenue absolutely and relative to output is a major cause o f poverty 
in at least a majority o f SSA countries. Since the end o f the 1970s public consumption per 
capita has fallen 50% (whereas private consumption per capita has fallen and recovered to 
near 1980 levels in a majority o f countries). Further there is reason to believe quality has 
fallen. A part from the general burden there is clear reason to suppose it falls 
disproportionately on poor people. Service provision decays from the peripheries both 
geographically and socio-politically e.g. health services abandon the countryside and become 
attenuated in peri urban areas long before they are cut to unsustainable levels in central urban 
hospitals. The only answer is more resources mobilised and their pro poor allocation. That 
includes paying a living household income to public servants as a medium term goal and 
rapid increase to at least 50% thereof (assuming the possibility and reality o f diversified 
household income streams). At their low point teachers, nurses, constables received about 
20% in M ozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. Even now after major efforts they remain 
below 50%. The main point is not that these public servants are a poverty group (true and
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relevant as that is) but that, without less bad pay, productivity, morality and morale will 
decline and privatised, variable ‘user fees’ will proliferate -  both highly disadvantageous to 
poor people.
9. Anti poor policies are a cause -  what policies by urban (state, enterprise, civil society) vary. 
Not all are self evidently anti poor. E.g. in Mozambique until recently registered (not 
incorporated) enterprise taxes were 50% even in cases in which the comparable individual 
tax rate would have been 20% or less. This encouraged small enterprises to seek invisibility, 
not taking up programmes o f potential benefit to them and not expanding (and thus hiring 
more workers whose households would then have moved out o f poverty). A civil society 
example is the deformation o f some historic inheritance systems to strip widows and children 
o f assets (hurling them into poverty) without providing the access to housing, food and 
protection that were traditionally the counterpart o f such backward or sideways inheritance.
Put in the way it is here this analysis may appear to be common sense and to provide a firm 
foundation for direct erection o f sustainable poverty reduction policies and programmes. That is, 
unfortunately, not the case.
First, the interactions among and weights of, causal elements vary within as well as between 
countries and over time. Identification in detail is harder than broad outline. Further until the 
causes o f relatively good performance are identified policy and programme shifts (which 
normally require reallocations as well as addition) run the risk o f doing unintended damage.
Second, devising and -  especially -  articulating strategy and a package o f policies and 
programmes which can have significant poverty reduction results and can be financed is both 
complex and difficult (especially perhaps on the resource mobilisation side). While there are 
few viable alternatives to its being state led (certainly not donor or external NGO designed and 
led) it must have broader civil society and household understanding, support and participation to 
be fully effective.
Third, implementation takes time and regular monitoring -  evaluation -  adjustment. Initial 
efforts will reveal unforeseen problems -  and opportunities -  even if contexts do not change 
which they usually do. It is 90% perspiration by large numbers o f poor people, 9% service
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provision by relatively (or even absolutely) poor public servants and civil society leaders and 1% 
analysis, strategy inspiration.
However, the absence o f the 1% will, at best, greatly reduce the productivity o f the 99%. 
Inadequate holistic causal analysis (which is endemic) can be expected to lead to unsound, ill 
balanced and/or unsustainable strategies and to distort policy and project selection.
IV. 
AFRICA END OF M ILLENNIUM PANORAMA
Poverty in Sub Saharan Africa is high and, at least in absolute numbers (headcount), rising. This 
is true whether household personal consumption is used alone or a broader array o f tests. Levels 
and rates, indeed directions o f change, vary widely as does quality o f  data. That summary is 
indeed approximate but the high levels and the absence o f general sustainable falls in poverty 
incidence both confirm less empirical and analytical observations and fully justify giving policy 
and resource allocation priority to poverty reduction.
At an econometric level the rate o f rise (fall) o f output per capita is correlated with falling (rising 
) headcount and proportional poverty on the household personal consumption test and probably 
with less deterioration/more quantitative growth with some quality control retained in respect o f 
basic services. However, the output growth elasticity for poverty (negative when poverty is 
falling) is relatively low and in most cases is swamped by apparent income (really consumption) 
redistribution. This is a surprising result (and would probably not hold were basic service access 
and absence o f war included in criteria surveyed). Analytical reasons for inequality decline are 
patchy and problematic.
The negative side turns on the 50% per capita fall in real basic service delivery (which shows 
few signs o f  sustainable, widespread reversal) and on the now emerging negative movements in 
social indicators likely to reflect that fall with a lag. Life expectancy at birth is stagnant or 
falling in an increasing number o f countries over the last five years while there are indication the 
slowing o f  reduction in infant and under5 mortality may also go into reverse. (These indicators
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are affected by but cannot be explained solely by the HIV epidemic and the other massive killer 
disease is static in incidence (a failure in the sense control programmes should yield falls). The 
non lagged physical indicators such as % o f age group enrolled in primary school and o f  rural 
and urban access to pure water have been stagnant or declining in a majority o f SSA countries 
for rather longer and the negative headline numbers severe deteriorations in quality and 
(especially in water) serviceability o f nominally existing capacity.
Beyond these generalisations there are an increasing number o f country or zone or village studies 
which give insights but do not necessarily point to generalisations in either time or space.
What can be said to be known applicably to many, and requiring checking in all countries?
1. Headcounts (numbers in poverty) are rising from the 1990 World Development Report 
estimate o f slightly over 200 million to slightly under 325 million - hardly surprising with 
stagnant or falling real output per capita in constant domestic price terms combined with 
radically falling per capita external assistance and negative terms o f external trade shifts; but
2. whether they still rising as a proportion o f population (if WDR and later estimates are taken 
at face value the shift is from about 31% at the end o f the 1980's to 40% in the mid 1990's) 
on which country results appear to be more diverse is less clear;
3. Growth in per capita output and poverty proportion decline are correlated significantly but 
this accounts for little o f the gain (or loss if, as is frequent, output is growing less rapidly than 
population); making
4. redistribution the most significant factor in reducing absolute poverty headcount growth and - 
probably - reducing depth o f poverty in countries as diverse as Zambia and M auritania;
5. its causation and thus ways o f supporting, enhancing and/or sustaining it are unclear; while
6. the locus o f poverty has shifted from 1-2% urban (98-99% rural) in the early 1960's to 10% 
odd in the early 1980’s to probably on average 25% today. On the one hand the urban 
proportion o f population has risen from about 10% to over 33% and in addition urban 
wage/Consumer Price Index terms o f trade have fared even worse than effective crop 
price/CPI terms;
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7. these general characteristics are not inaccurate but virtually all are based entirely on 
household personal consumption;
8. adding Basic Service Access and War risk to poverty indicators used in generalising would 
significantly improve the urban position relative to rural areas which have suffered more 
severely from reduced access to basic services and from war damage to security; so that
9. the quite limited (except in very bad years) reduction in urban growth rates (usually twice 
national) is not evidence o f some irrational 'bright lights o f the city' disposition. Taking more 
measures into account, urban life, even for most poor urban households, remains less 
deprived than their available rural alternatives. Further the phenomenon o f initially 
temporary urban migration to seek to break out o f the safer but effectively income capped 
small farming household sector into riskier upmarket urban livelihoods with the intent to 
return if  no breakthrough is achieved in 2 or 3 years remains even if to a lesser extent than in 
the 1960's or 1970's.
The increased use o f broad open ended at least quasi participatory consultations or forums
together with/complementary to Household Survey has thrown up a number o f  insights as to
perceptions and priorities:
a. government, usually, is still viewed as being a potential part o f the answer and expected to 
play that role even though civil society bodies (especially religious bodies, women's 
organisations, sometimes trade or peasant unions) are now more numerous and more active 
in respect to at least some poverty issues;
b. the highest priorities are security (against violent interference with ordinary life and 
livelihood by anybody - whether war, bandits, own army, police, officials, rich neighbours' 
thugs), curative medicine and water (a highly gendered issue as it is women and girls' work 
load and/or cash budgets it would benefit). Except for health these have not featured 
prom inently on most standard lists drawn up by analysts and practitioners in the past;
c. access to markets (roads, transport and both buyers and sellers preferably multiple and 
com petitive) and - in some cases - food security in bad years are also cited fairly frequently;
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d. education is given notably lower priority than might have been expected - especially in rural 
areas.
Care is needed in interpretation. If  a service is provided less inadequately expanding it may be a 
lower voiced priority precisely for that reason. For example immunisation/vaccination and 
mother and child clinics are (because o f UNICEF; sustained catalytic, mobilising and extension 
roles in at least a significant number o f cases adopted and internalised by African institutions and 
leaders) often better provided for than general curative services. Alternatively - or 
complementarily - because they are provided almost entirely to women and children, who are 
underrepresented and under vocal in most forums/participatory dialogues they nay be under­
recorded for that reason. Rural lack o f high prioritisation to education probably relates in part to 
low quality, in part to limited perceived direct or indirect contribution to rural livelihoods and 
welfare and in part to the collapse o f the 1960's illusion that UPE would catapult everybody who 
completed it into the absolute and relative (largely waged and urban) up market positions o f  the 
10% o f adults who had it prior to independence. In addition services never provided by the state 
probably will not be on priority lists - e.g. in 1987 in Somalia (but not in Somaliland) rural 
respondents did not prioritise government health services because to all intents and purposes they 
did not exist and had always been exiguous (whereas the late British colonial model in 
Somaliland had provided more and endured to a degree in - foreign funded - practice and even 
more in memory).
What can be said o f policies? In general negative ones - e.g. highly cost inefficient, manager 
benefiting, single channel marketing systems have been abandoned with real impact on export 
crop grower prices but less on domestic food crops which were either not covered (most 
secondary foods, fish, poultry and small stock and often cattle) or were massively by-passed - 
have been reduced in number and severity. That is positive - at least to a point. Many - e.g. 
co-ops, marketing boards - were targeted on very real prior market failures. That many created 
worse intervention or institutional failures may well be good grounds for abolition, but is likely 
to leave the original market failure and a need to tackle it in a new way. e.g. local monopoly 
combined transporters - produce buyers - general merchandise sellers - seasonal credit providers 
are better than no functioning rural commercial system but are, by quite standard analysis,
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virtually certain to distort markets against poor households. They are in their way at best 
analogous to mini, local Microsofts.
W hether poverty programmes, policies and strategies are given more priority than in - say -
1980 by m ost SSA governments is unclear.
At declamatory level - yes. But this may be to improve donor and poor voter image. This is 
especially true when national poverty oriented analysts are largely expatriate and programmes 
picked from donor menus. However, presentation o f a poverty strategy or programme in donor 
friendly language can have at least three meanings:
1. cynical formulation o f proposals to maximise short term receipts from donors while counting 
on fungibility and lack o f transparency to provide real desired (by domestic decision takers) 
payoffs;
2. opportunistic use to meet real - and at least partially poverty focused priorities/gaps not 
readily fundable otherwise, e.g. in the 1980's Tanzania's First Social Dimensions o f 
Adjustment programme focused on textbooks (and inputs to print them), rural water spares 
and non pharmaceutical medical supplies even if its terminology was broader to increase 
chances o f  W orld Bank funding;
3. a national strategy and priorities (backed by enhanced domestically led mapping and 
allocation o f  senior personnel) may be 'translated into donorese' - and some domestic non­
priority, but donor friendly, elements added on the basis that without such translation donors 
will not transfer more resources and without the transfers the programmes cannot be 
sustained no matter how well designed or how desired by poor people. Mozambique for 
nearly a decade from 1987 was a case in point.
Probably more African decision takers and professionals (absolutely and proportionally) are 
seriously interested in/give priority to reducing poverty. Added information does enlighten, 
participation and competitive elections do alter priorities. But transparent, coherent strategies 
articulated to policy and project packages and tested against both financial feasibility and poor 
person perceived priorities remain veiy much the exception.
19
Curiously, much the same could be said o f bilateral donors and most international development 
organisations and NGOs. Excluding survival support during wars and calamities relatively 
low proportions of resource are allocated to direct or reasoned indirect (e.g. rural roads, 
credit access for rural oriented transporters, buyers and sellers to restore working capital and 
transport capacity) poverty reduction programmes. Nor do these agencies have articulated 
country specific strategies (nor usually personnel to develop them) as opposed to a list o f very 
general themes and very specific particular projects - e.g. micro credit, a current fashion, which 
is promoted without contextual testing or seeking to learn from negative as well as positive 
experiences elsewhere.
That then is the SSA poverty panorama o f the last years o f the millennium. It is far from bright 
either as to present levels, recent rends or future prospects. On the other hand it is by no means 
totally negative. Post war r-r-r, even when badly underfinanced, has reduced consumption 
poverty and improved trampolines and household security substantially and rapidly in several 
cases e.g. M ozambique, Somaliland, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Except in the most war wracked 
territories things have fallen apart less and less rapidly than might reasonably have been expected 
(or than Afro pessimists such as Kaplan and at one phase Mazrui predicted). And in several 
cases - e.g. Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda - resiliency and the ability to mount recoveries (even if 
limited) has been impressive.
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